

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 03233 01 OF 02 080120Z

12

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

----- 078114

R 080030Z JUN 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6195

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4088

USNMR SHAPE

USMISSION GENEVA

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 3233

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: NATO, PFOR, XG

SUBJECT: CSCE: STATEMENT BY US REPRESENTATIVE IN NAC, JUNE 7

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL

REF: (A) GENEVA 3468 NOTAL

(B) STATE 119113 NOTAL

FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SHERER, US CSCE
REPRESENTATIVE, IN NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON JUNE 7:

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. CHAIRMAN,

ONCE AGAIN WE WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS CSCE IN THE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, ESPECIALLY SINCE THIS MEETING COMES AT A
KEY MOMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFERENCE. WE HOPE OUR
DISCUSSION TODAY WILL HELP TO HARMONIZE OUR VIEWS ON CSCE AS WE
APPROACH THE MINISTERIAL MEETING IN OTTAWA, AND WILL REINFORCE THE
UNITY OF BASIC ATTITUDES WHICH HAS GENERALLY CHARACTERIZED ALLIED
COORDINATION IN GENEVA.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 03233 01 OF 02 080120Z

BEFORE MENTIONING ONE OR TWO SPECIFIC PROBLEMS IN CSCE, I WOULD
LIKE TO SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE GENERAL STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE
CONFERENCE, AS THOSE WHO HAVE SPOKEN BEFORE ME HAVE DONE. IN DOING SO,

I WILL TRY TO CONCENTRATE MY REMARKS ON SOME OF THE ESSENTIAL SUBJECTS

MENTIONED IN THE PAPER OF THE NINE WHICH WAS DISTRIBUTED TO US ALL LAST WEEK. OUR VIEW OF THE OVERALL SITUATION IN CSCE IS THAT PRESENT PROGRESS IS NOT UNREASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WITH THE OBVIOUS

EXCEPTIONS OF MILITARY ASPECTS AND BASKET III. THE IMPASSE IN THESE AREAS IS DISAPPOINTING AND FRUSTRATING; AT THIS POINT, MOST OF US WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO FINISH THE CONFERENCE AND GO HOME. BUT, DESPITE

OUR PERSONAL FEELINGS, WE BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL TO BEAR IN MIND THE BROADER EAST-WEST SITUATION, AND THE REALITIES OF NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIETS. A REALISTIC APPRAISAL OF CSCE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS IS, IN OUR VIEW, FUNDAMENTAL TO THE NEGOTIATING DISCIPLINE WHICH WE WILL REQUIRE IF CSCE IS TO BE BROUGHT TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

WE BELIEVE THAT OUR PROBLEMS IN GENEVA SHOULD NOT CAUSE US TO LOSE SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT CSCE IS ONLY ONE OF SEVERAL PROJECTS WHICH WE ALL HOPE WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROCESS OF DETENTE. WE IN THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE TO SEE THIS CONFERENCE AS A MODEST, BUT IMPORTANT, STEP FORWARD WITHIN THE BROAD FRAMEWORK OF DETENTE, AND I BELIEVE THIS ATTITUDE IS SHARED BY MOST OF THE GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTED HERE. THIS PROCESS OF DETENTE HAS INCLUDED OTHER MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, FOR EXAMPLE ON BERLIN AND, CURRENTLY, ON MBFR, AS WELL AS THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES. IT IS EASY FOR THOSE OF US WHO ARE INVOLVED IN CSCE TO SEE IT AS A SUMMATION OF DETENTE, AT ONCE ITS TEST AND ITS CLIMAX. FOR OUR PART, WE HAVE NO SUCH AMBITIONS FOR CSCE, AND OUR EXPECTATIONS REGARDING POSSIBLE CONFERENCE RESULTS ARE TEMPERED BY THE BROADER PERSPECTIVE OF DETENTE. WE BELIEVE THE WEST SHOULD WORK FOR POSITIVE RESULTS IN CSCE, BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE SHOULD NOT SET OUR GOALS UNREALISTICALLY HIGH.

LIKEWISE, WE BELIEVE THAT OUR PREOCCUPATION WITH OUR PRESENT PROBLEMS IN GENEVA SHOULD NOT LEAD US TO FORGET THE HARD REALITIES OF NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 03233 01 OF 02 080120Z

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS REQUIRE GREAT PATIENCE AND SELF CONTROL,

AND THAT, AS SOMEONE HAS SAID, ONE OF THE SECRETS TO SUCCESS IS TO BE PREPARED TO WAIT LONGER THAN THEY ARE.

I THINK THIS MOTTO IS WORTH RECALLING NOW BECAUSE I AM AFRAID IMPATIENCE AND FRUSTRATION MAY LEAD US TOWARD ACTIONS WHICH ARE NOT FULLY IN KEEPING WITH OUR OVERALL OBJECTIVES. IN SAYING THIS I ASSUME THAT OUR WESTERN OBJECTIVES IN CSCE ARE, BROADLY SPEAKING, TO MAKE PRACTICAL PROGRESS TOWARD DETENTE WHILE AVOIDING MEASURES DETRIMENTAL TO OUR OWN INTERESTS. I BELIEVE SUCH OBJECTIVES CAN BE SERVED BY A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO CSCE, BUT NOT BY A FAILURE.

IF WE ARE, INDEED, INTERESTED IN A SUCCESSFUL CSCE, I CAN SEE
NO COURSE FOR US BUT THE PATIENT, FIRM APPROACH WHICH HAS
BROUGHT RESULTS IN, FOR EXAMPLE, THE FOUR-POWER NEGOTIATIONS ON BERLIN.

THERE HAS BEEN MUCH TALK RECENTLY OF POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION
WHICH MIGHT BE CONTEMPLATED IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESENT STALEMATE OVER
BASKET III SUBJECTS. OUR VIEW IS THAT MANY OF THE POSSIBILITIES WHICH
HAVE BEEN MENTIONED ARE COMPATIBLE WITH THE FIRM, PATIENT
APPROACH I DESCRIBED. FOR EXAMPLE, WE AGREE THAT WESTERN DISSATIS-
FACTION WITH THE PRESENT PACE OF CSCE WORK AND SOVIET RELUCTANCE T
MOVE ON BASKET III ISSUES SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS. BUT WE
FEEL IT COULD WELL BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE IF THIS IS DONE IN SUCH A WAY

AS TO PUT THE SOVIETS UNDER PUBLIC PRESSURE TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IN
AREAS WHICH
ARE OBVIOUSLY SENSITIVE FOR THEM, BOTH PRACTICALLY AND IDEOLO-
GICALLY. WE WOULD HOPE T AVOID ANYTHING WHICH LOOKED LIKE PUBLIC
PRESSURE OR WHICH SOUNDED LIKE AN ULTIMATUM. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES,
PRIVATE DEMARCHES IN CAPITALS OR AT A HIGH LEVEL WOULD APPEAR TO BE THE

MOST APPROPRIATE STEP AT THIS TIME.

NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O - MR. NEWLIN.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NATO 03233 02 OF 02 080210Z

12
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W
----- 078764

R 080030Z JUN 74
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6196
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4089
USNMR SHAPE
USMISSION GENEVA
RUFHMB /USDDEL MBFR VIENNA 25
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 3233
EXDIS

WITH REGARD TO MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY, IT MIGHT ALSO BE
USEFUL TO MAKE A GENERAL OBSERVATION. DESPITE SOME HINTS, THE
SOVIETS HAVE SHOWN NO DISPOSITION YET TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS
NEGOTIATIONS ON MILITARY QUESTIONS. THE SECOND READING OF THE
DRAFT TEXT SO FAR HAS PRODUCED LITTLE MORE THAN A RESTATEMENT OF
POSITIONS TAKEN DURING THE DRAFTING PROCESS. WE ARE ALSO CONSCIOUS
OF THE FACT THAT THE NEUTRALS HAVE NOT TO ANY EXTENT LOWERED THEIR
SIGHTS AND AMBITIONS. THE US WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT
SUBSTANTIVE MEASURES ON MANEUVERS AND THE EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS

WHICH WOULD COVER A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THE TERRITORY OF THE EUROPEAN USSR.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE RECENT DISCUSSIONS IN NATO WITH REGARD TO THE ZONE IN THE USSR TO BE COVERED BY CBMS REPRESENT A REALISTIC ATTEMPT TO BEGIN TO CONSIDER POSITIONS WITH REGARD TO MEASURES RELATED TO MANEUVERS THAT MAY SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR THE COMPROMISES THAT DOUBTLESS WILL BE NEEDED AS DEBATE PROGRESSES IN CSCE. THE MEASURES ADVANCED BY THE ALLIES THUS FAR ARE CLEARLY GOING TO BE DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT, AND THUS IN THE WEEKS AHEAD IT WILL BE ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT TO PRESERVE ALLIED SOLIDARITY ON CBMS. MOREOVER, IT WILL REMAIN ESSENTIAL TO COORDINATE CLOSELY BOTH HERE AND IN GENEVA ON TACTICS IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS AND THE NEUTRALS IN A MANNER WHICH BEST SERVES ALLIED INTERESTS.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 03233 02 OF 02 080210Z

AS FOR THE THOUGHTS WHICH HAVE RECENTLY BEEN EXPRESSED ON THE TIMING OF THE END OF STAGE II AND THE CONVENING OF STAGE III, WE WOULD HOPE TO KEEP ALL OPTIONS OPEN AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. FOR OUR PART, WE HAVE NOT YET RULED OUT ANY SCENARIOS, AND CONSIDER THAT ALL POSSIBILITIES REMAIN OPEN. MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE THAT ANY WESTERN DECISION WHICH MAY HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE TIMING OF THE CONCLUSION OF CSCE -- SUCH AS PROPOSALS FOR RECESS, POSTPONEMENT, OR INTERRUPTION OF STAGE II -- MAY HAVE FAR-REACHING RAMIFICATIONS, AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE REVIEWED CAREFULLY IN CAPITALS AND IN THIS COUNCIL BEFORE ACTION IS TAKEN.

MR. CHAIRMAN, IN ADDITION TO THESE GENERAL REMARKS, I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION TWO SPECIFIC SUBJECTS RELATING TO CSCE WHICH MAY REQUIRE FURTHER REFLECTION IN THE WEEKS AHEAD. THESE ARE THE TREATMENT OF THE MEDITERRANEAN IN THE FINAL CSCE DOCUMENTS, AND FOLLOW-UP.

I SAID EARLIER THAT WE BELIEVE CSCE HAS A SIGNIFICANT, BUT LIMITED, PLACE IN THE PROCESS OF DETENTE IN EUROPE. THIS HAS ALWAYS BEEN OUR APPROACH TO THE CONFERENCE, AND WE BELIEVE IT SHOULD GUIDE OUR ATTITUDES EVEN MORE STRONGLY DURING THE NEXT WEEKS OF WORK IN STAGE 2. THIS CONCEPT OF THE CSCE FOCUSED ON EUROPEAN PROBLEMS HAS BEEN A REASON FOR OUR OPPOSITION TO THE IDEA OF A CSCE DECLARATION ON THE MEDITERRANEAN. REGRETTABLY, THE ISSUE OF A MEDITERRANEAN DECLARATION HAS BECOME AN ISSUE WHICH THREATENS TO BROADEN CSCE DISCUSSION BEYOND ITS EUROPEAN FOCUS, AND TO INTRODUCE EXTRANEIOUS ISSUES WHICH COULD POSE PROBLEMS UNLESS APPROACHED CAREFULLY. IN MY PREVIOUS DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE OF A MEDITERRANEAN DECLARATION, I OUTLINED US VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT, AND FOR THE MOMENT I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO ADD TO WHAT I SAID EARLIER. HOWEVER, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THIS ISSUE MERITS SERIOUS ATTENTION, AND, FOR OUR PART, WE WILL REFLECT CAREFULLY UPON THE VIEWS PRESENTED TO US ON THIS SUBJECT. I WOULD REPEAT IN THIS CONNECTION THAT IT WOULD BE REGRETTABLE, INDEED, IF THIS ISSUE BECAME ONE WHICH DIVIDED US IN CSCE.

THE SECOND SPECIFIC SUBJECT I WOULD LIKE TO RAISE IS FOLLOW-UP.

BRIEFLY, MR. CHAIRMAN, WE ARE NOT YET CONVINCED OF THE NEED FOR A FOLLOW-UP MECHANISM WITH A GENERAL POLITICAL-SECURITY MANDATE. WE HAVE GIVEN GENERAL SUPPORT TO THE PROPOSAL OF THENINE FOR AN INTERIM PERIOD FOLLOWED BY A MEETING OF HIGH OFFICIALS TO EVALUATE CSCE RESULTS. BUT THERE IS ONE ASPECT OF THE NINE'S PROPOSAL ON THIS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 03233 02 OF 02 080210Z

SUBJECT WHICH WE FEEL GOES BEYOND WHAT IS NECESSARY OR WISE AT THIS TIME. WE HAVE MENTIONED THIS POINT IN THE NATO CAUSCUSIN GENEVA, AND I WOULD LIKE TO REPEAT IT HERE, SINCE I BELIEVE IT HAS BROAD IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE. THE NINE'S PAPER STATES THAT, IN ADDITION TO AN EVALUATION OF THE CONFERENCE RESULTS, THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING SHOULD EVALUATE "THE STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN GENERAL." WE FEEL THIS MAJDATE IS TOO OPEN-ENDED, AND WOULD PERMIT DISCUSSION OF MBFR, OR OTHER ISSUES OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF CSCE. WE RECOGNIZE THAT, AS IN CSCE STAGE I, NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES MAY REFER TO A BROAD RANGE OF SUBJECTS DURING

THE MEETING OF IGH OFFICIALS, BUT WE SEE NO NEED TO ENCOURAGE THIS THROUGH SUCH A BROAD MANDATE. WE WOULD PREFER TO MANDATE CONFINED

TO "DISCUSSION OF OTHER ISSUES FALLING WITHIN THE AGENDA OF THE CONFERENCE", OR SOME SIMILAR LANGUAGE.

MR. CHAIRMAN, THIS COVERS THE POINTS I WANTED TO MAKE, AND I CAN ONLY REPEAT ONCE AGAIN THE VALUE WE ATTACH TO OUR DISCUSSIONS OF CSCE HERE AT NATO, AND TO THE CONCIL'S INTEREST IN THE CONFERENCE.

END TEXT

RUMSFELD

NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O - MR. NEWLIN.

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 11 JUN 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 08 JUN 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974ATO03233
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740687/abbryvmj.tel
Line Count: 251
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: (A) GENEVA 3468 NOTAL (B) STATE 119113 NOTAL
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 20 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <20 MAR 2002 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <08 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CSCE: STATEMENT BY US REPRESENTATIVE IN NAC, JUNE 7
TAGS: NATO, PFOR, XG
To: STATE INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
USNMR SHAPE
GENEVA
MBFR VIENNA
MOSCOW
EC BRUSSELS
Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005